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Abstract While a large body of evidence suggests that unemployment and self-reported
happiness are negatively correlated, it is not clear whether this reects a causal eect of
unemployment on happiness and whether subsidized employment can increase the happi-
ness of the unemployed. To close this gap, this paper estimates the causal eect of a type
of subsidized employment projects - Germany's Arbeitsbeschaungsmanahmen - on self-
reported happiness. Results from matching and xed eects estimators suggest that subsi-
dized employment has a large and statistically signicant positive eect on the happiness of
individuals who would otherwise have been unemployed. Detailed panel data on pre- and
post-project happiness suggests that this eect can neither be explained by self-selection of
happier individuals into employment nor by the higher incomes of the employed.
Keywords: Happiness, Life Satisfaction, Unemployment, Subsidized Employment
JEL Classication: J28, J68
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11 Introduction
A large body of research shows that the unemployed report signicantly lower levels
of happiness 1 and higher levels of psychological distress than the employed (see McKee-
Ryan, 2005, for a review of the psychological literature). The negative correlation between
unemployment and happiness, both across individuals and over time, remains signicant
after controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics, including income (Clark and
Oswald 1994, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998, Marks and Fleming 1999, Clark 2003,
Carroll 2007). A possible explanation for this nding is that, in addition to income, jobs
confer social status, respect and a sense of purpose, competence and ecacy, all of which
are thought to be important contributors to well-being and job-satisfaction (Izard 1991,
Ryan and Deci 2000, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2007, Ariely et al. 2008. Involuntary
unemployment 2 may therefore have a psychological cost - a negative eect on well-being
that goes beyond its eects on income and consumption (Frey and Stutzer 2002, Carroll
2007). A psychological cost of unemployment would have implications for labor market and
welfare policy, implying that the welfare cost of unemployment is greater than the value of
lost output and that subisidized employment may be a better way to increase the well-being
of the unemployed than direct cash transfers (see, for example, Edlin and Phelps 2009, who
cite the psychological benets of employment as an argument for the introduction of tax
credits for employers of low-wage workers).
But the evidence for a negative causal eect of unemployment on happiness is not entirely
conclusive. Happiness and unemployment are simultaneously determined, so it is possible
that unobserved shocks - for example adverse shocks to (mental) health - simultaneously
decrease happiness and increase the probability of becoming or remaining unemployed (e.g.
Mastekaasa 1996). There is some evidence that a similar mechanism may explain the nega-
tive correlation between self-reported health and unemployment. While the unemployed on
1For the rest of the paper, I use the term \happiness" to denote \self-reported happiness". Following
Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), I use happiness as synonymous with life-satisfaction and well-being.
2For the rest of the paper, I will use the term \unemployment" to denote \involuntary unemployment".
2average report worse subjective health than the employed, individuals who lose their jobs
for exogenous reasons, such as the closure of their employer's business, do not experience a
decline in subjective health (Salm, 2009). Causality is therefore likely to run from bad health
to unemployment and not in the other direction (Bockermann and Ilmakunnas, 2009). If
the same is true for happiness, the unemployed may be less happy than the employed even
if unemployment has no causal eect on happiness.
But even if unemployment causes unhappiness on average, it is not clear that subsidized
employment can increase happiness. It is possible that happiness is only increased by jobs
that have certain desirable characteristics, such as being perceived as meaningful or con-
ferring high social status and respect (Ellingsen 2007, Ariely 2008). Since the jobs created
by subsidized employment are often poorly paid and confer little social status, it is possible
that they do not have the desirable characteristics that cause an increase in happiness. In
other words, even if the average job increases the happiness of the average employee, the
marginal job created by an employment subsidy may have no (or even a negative) eect on
the happiness of the marginal employee.
This paper contributes to the literature on happiness and unemployment by estimating
the eect of subsidized employment on the happiness of the unemployed. To do this I analyze
the happiness of participants in a type of public subsidized employment projects (SEPs) -
Germany's Arbeitsbeschaungsmanahmen. Previous research suggests that these projects
have on average had little success in increasing participants' future income and probability
of employment (Hujer et al. 2004, Caliendo et al. 2008). But if the goal of public policy is
to increase people's happiness, employment subsidies may still be desirable if they prevent
the unhappiness of unemployment.
Since participation in the subsidized employment projects is non-random, my identi-
cation strategy relies on detailed panel data on happiness before and after the start of the
project. The data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel which, among other things,
collects information on respondents' happiness and employment status, including partici-
3pation in subsidized employment projects. Using this data I show that, for the duration
of the subsidized employment project, the happiness of participants is signicantly higher
than that of unemployed non-participants with similar observable characteristics. The data
further show that participants and similar non-participants have virtually identical levels
and trends of happiness in the months before the start of the project, which suggests that
the observed eect is not driven by self-selection of happier individuals into the projects.
Quantitative estimates from xed-eects and nearest-neighbor matching estimators suggest
that, compared to the counterfactual of remaining unemployed, subsidized employment in-
creases happiness by about 0.4 to 0.6 points on a scale from 0-10. This eect corresponds
to about 0.4 within-individual standard deviations of happiness, which is large compared to
the eects of other observable characteristics like income and marital status.
It should be noted that this estimate does not reect the total eect of subsidized em-
ployment programs on the happiness of their participants, but only their eect against the
counterfactual of remaining unemployed. Some participants would have found employment
even without the SEP, so that the overall eect of participating in the project (against the
counterfactual of not participating) is most likely smaller. Still, the estimated eect can be
useful for evaluating the eect of employment subsidies on happiness. Regardless of whether
some participants would have found jobs in the absence of the SEP, economic theory suggests
that an employment subsidy creates jobs in equilibrium. One could therefore combine this
paper's estimate of the eect of subidized employment on happiness with an estimate of the
number of jobs created by the subsidy in equilibrium to derive an estimate of its total eect
on happiness.
As an additional contribution, I attempt to determine whether subsidized employment
increases happiness by conferring direct psychological benets - for example by conferring
social status and the feeling of being useful - or by increasing income and consumption.
In order to draw policy conclusions it is important to disentangle these two channels. A
happiness-based argument for publicly subsidized jobs, similar to the one made by Edlin
4and Phelps (2009), only holds if employment itself increases happiness. If the employed
are merely happier because of their higher incomes, direct income transfers are a more
cost-eective way of increasing the happiness of the unemployed. To disentangle the two
channels, I exploit the fact that participation in a SEP prolongs individuals' entitlement
to public unemployment benets. Thus the projects' positive eect on income remains
even after employment in it has ended. This creates sucient independent variation in
income and employment to allow me to identify the eect of employment while controlling
for dierences in income. Intuitively, if the positive eect of SEPs on happiness were mainly
due to their eect on income, we would expect participants' happiness to remain high as
long as the project's eect on income persists, even after employment has ended. But the
data show that participants' happiness decreases substantially as employment in the project
ends, suggesting that employment has psychological benets that are independent of its eect
on income. To obtain quantitative estimates of the net eect of employment on happiness
(excluding the eect of income), I estimate a xed eects instrumental variables estimator
that exploits the fact that participants' probability of employment drops sharply at the end
of the subsidized employment project while their incomes remain nearly unchanged.
The next section briey describes the institutional details of Germany's subsidized em-
ployment projects. Section 3 describes the econometric methods used to identify the causal
eect of subsidized employment on happiness. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and present
results, Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background: Subsidized Employment
Projects in Germany
Subsidized employment projects (Arbeitsbeschaungsmanahmen, SEPs) have been an
integral part of Germany's active labor market policy for over 30 years (Bernhard et al.,
2008). Figure 1 plots the trend of entrants into SEPs over the period of observation, 1994-
52004, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the unemployed3. At the peak in
1994, approximately 390,000 individuals - slightly over 10% of all unemployed individuals -
entered a SEP within a single year. The average annual number of entrants is about 280,000,
corresponding to approximately 6% of unemployed individuals.
The institutional rules governing subsidized employment projects have been described
in detail by Hujer et al. (2004) and Caliendo et al. (2008) and this section draws on their
descriptions. The two main instruments of German active labor market policy are vocational
training and subsidized employment projects. Local job-centers have a large amount of
autonomy in allocating their budget to dierent policies, but subsidized employment appears
to be the favored instrument in areas with higher unemployment. To create a subsidized
employment project, the potential employer applies to the job-center with a description of
the proposed jobs. The job-center assesses the proposal according to a number of criteria,
most importantly whether the proposed activity is in the public interest and whether the
activity is \additional" in nature, meaning that it would not be undertaken in the absence
of a SEP. Up to 2002, SEPs were reserved for employers in the non-prot sector, after 2002
exceptions became possible with the approval of the job-center. After approving the SEP,
the job-center assigns some of its unemployed clients to the project and pays between 30
and 75 % of their wages, though in exceptional cases the amount of the subsidy can go up to
100%. In the assignment decision, job-centers are mandated to give priority to individuals
whose chances of employment outside of SEPs are small.
Before 2002, participants in SEPs had to be unemployed for at least 6 out of the previous
12 months, though exceptions existed for young people without professional training, the
short-term unemployed and people with disabilities. In addition, 5 % of the places in SEPs
could be allocated to individuals who did not meet any of these conditions. After 2002, all
unemployed individuals could be assigned to SEPs, under the condition that the job-center
3The \Hartz-IV" labor market reforms, which came into force in January 2005, introduced substantial
changes to the system of subsidized employment in Germany. Arbeitsbeschaungsmanahmen lost in im-
portance and were largely replaced with so-called One-Euro-Jobs. In order to keep the results consistent, I
therefore only focus on the period until 2004
6saw the SEP as their only opportunity for employment. Individuals can refuse to participate
in the project, but refusal can be penalized by a reduction in unemployment benets. The
duration of a project is usually 12 months but projects can be extended in special cases.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 A simple model of happiness and (un)employment
This section presents a simple empirical model of happiness and (un)employment. It
assumes that the happiness of individual i while being unemployed at time t is a function of
her characteristics (Xit) at the time,
hit(0) = f(Xit)
while the individual's happiness while being employed in job k is also a function of the
job's characteristics (Zkt),
hit(k) = g(Xit;Zkt)
The goal of this paper is to estimate the expected dierence in hit(k) and hit(0) for
participant/job pairs created by subsidized employment programs (SEPs),
 = EXit;Zkt[hit(k)   hit(0)]; (i;k;t) 2 S
where (i;k;t) 2 S implies that at time t individual i participated in a SEP, through
which she was employed in job k. The parameter  is the expected gain in happiness the
average participant in a SEP experiences at a given point in time from being employed in
the SEP rather than being unemployed.
As mentioned in the introduction, this is of course not the total eect of subsidized
7employment programs on the happiness of their participants. First, some participants would
have found employment even without the SEP and, second, SEPs may aect future happiness
by changing the probability and characteristics of future employment. Still,  is useful for
evaluating the eect of employment subsidies on happiness. Regardless of whether some
participants would have found jobs without the SEP, economic theory suggests that an
employment subsidy creates jobs in equilibrium. Assuming that the characteristics of the
job/employee pairs created by a subsidy in equilibrium are the same as the characteristics of
the job/employee pairs in SEPs,  yields the eect of the average job created by the subsidy.
This could be combined with an estimate of the number of jobs created by an emplopyment
subsidy to yield an estimate of the subsidy's aggregate eect of happiness.
It should also be noted that  is an \average eect of treatment on the treated", since it
measures the eect of employment in SEPs on individuals who participate in them. Thus  is
the expected eect of employment in SEPs on individuals who are involuntarily unemployed
- meaning those who are willing to accept a low-paying job in a SEP - and not the eect on
the average person in the population.
3.2 A Matching Estimator for the Eect of Subsidized Employ-
ment on Happiness
To estimate , I use the nearest neighbor matching estimator described by Abadie and
Imbens (2002). Since we can observe individuals' happiness while employed in a SEP, hit(k),
the matching estimator only needs to estimate their counterfactual happiness while unem-
ployed, hit(0). This is imputed from the outcomes of matched unemployed non-participants







In this notation JM(i;t) is the set of matched control observations associated with par-
8ticipant i at time t. Matched controls are selected so that their observed characteristics
in the pre-treatment period Xjt 1 are as similar as possible to the observed characteris-
tics of the participant in the pre-tretament period Xit 1
4. More precisely, JM(i;t) is de-
ned as containing the M observations with the smallest distance between Xjt 1 and Xit 1,
using a suitable metric, so that observations are matched to their nearest neighbors in
the space of observed characteristics. For this paper, I use the standard distance metric
(Xjt 1   Xit 1)0 1(Xjt 1   Xit 1), where  is the covariance matrix of X.
Subsidized employment projects usually last for 12 months, which is the same as the
average interval between two interviews for the German Socio-Economic Panel. The majority
of participants is therefore observed only once per employment spell in a SEP 5.
For the baseline estimates, observations are matched on 11 variables: sex, age, years of
education, marital status, household size, number of children, unemployment status, house-
hold income, income from public unemployment benets, region6 and month of interview.
In an extended specication, observations are also matched on pre-treatment happiness in
order to control for unobserved determinants of happiness.
3.2.1 Testing the conditional independence assumption
The matching estimator's main identifying assumption is that, conditional on the pre-
treatment variables used for matching, Xit 1, the counterfactual outcome hit(0) is indepen-
dent of participation in a SEP. This assumption ensures that the actual outcome of the
unemployed matched non-participants hjt(0) is a consistent estimator of the counterfactual
outcome of the participants under unemployment, hit(0). It implies that participants in
subsidized employment projects would have been as (un)happy being unemployed as the
4Observations are matched on characteristics in the pre-treatment period in order to avoid that partici-
pants' characteristics are already aected by the treatment
5In some cases SEPs are extended beyond 12 months so that we observe particpants more than once
during the project. To avoid problems from endogenous duration of employment, the matching estimator
only uses participants' rst observation during a SEP. Results that use all observations within a SEP are
not reported, but are similar to the reported ones.
6Western or Eastern Germany
9matched non-participants who actually were unemployed.
There are two reasons why this assumption might be violated. First, happier people may
be more likely to participate in SEPs, so that participants may have been more happy than
non-participants even in the absence of the project. If this were the case, hit(0) would be
greater than hjt(0) and the matching estimator of  would be biased upward. Fortunately, the
panel nature of the data allows me to test for this violation by comparing the pre-treatment
happiness of participants, hit 1, to the happiness of matched controls in the pre-treatment
period, hjt 1. If happier individuals self-select into the project we would expect participants
to already be happier than matched controls in the pre-treatment observation, so that hit 1
would be greater than hjt 1. On the other hand, observing that hit 1 is equal to hjt 1, even
for observations close to the the start of the SEP, should increase our condence that happier
individuals do not self-select into the projects.
Second, since participation in SEPs is voluntary 7, people may self-select into the projects
according to how much they benet from them. Participants and matched controls may
therefore dier in how strongly their happiness is aected by unemployment, so that hit(0)
may be dierent from hjt(0) even if participants and controls were equally happy when being
employed in the pre-treatment observation. To test for this, I compare the pre-treatment
happiness of participants and matched controls who were unemployed in the pre-treatment
observation - hit 1(0) and hjt 1(0). Finding that participants and matched controls report
dierent levels of happiness when unemployed, or that their happiness during unemployment
follows dierent trends, would indicate that the groups are dierently aected by unemploy-
ment and that the conditional independenc assumption is violated. Finding no dierence in
pre-treatment levels and trends of happiness between unemployed participants and matched
controls should increase our condence that both groups are equally aected by unemploy-
ment and that the conditional independence assumption holds.
7Though repeated refusal to participate can be lead to sanctions by the job-center.
103.3 Disentangling the eects of income and employment
In principle, there are two ways in which employment in a SEP might aect happiness:
by conferring direct psychological benets - for example feelings of competence and ecacy
- and by increasing individuals' incomes. To inform policy, it is useful to disentangle these
two channels. A happiness-based argument for publicly subsidized jobs, similar to the one
made by Edlin and Phelps (2009), only holds if employment itself increases happiness. If
the employed are merely happier because of their higher incomes, direct income transfers are
likely to be a more cost-eective way of increasing the happiness of the unemployed.
I therefore present an estimator for the \pure" eect of employment on happiness, net
of the eect of increased incomes. Slightly modifying the notation of the previous section, I
dene hit(0;k) as the happiness that individual i reports at time t if she is unemployed but
her income is as high as if she were employed in job k. Using this notation, the net eect of
subsidized employment on happiness can be written as
 = EXit;Zkt[hit(k)   hit(0;k)]; (i;k) 2 S
where, as before, S is the set of job/employee pairs created through SEPs. Unfortu-
nately,  is not easily identied without additional assumptions. Comparing participants
and non-participants with similar post-treatment levels of income - either by matching on
post-treatment income, or controlling for it in a regression - would not cleanly identify the
eect. Since participation in a SEP has a positive eect on wage income, participants and
non-participants can only have identical incomes if they dier in unobserved variables. Com-
paring participants and matched controls with similar incomes therefore risks introducing
omitted variable bias (see, for example, Gelman and Hill 2007, pp 188-194).
To allow identication of , I assume that the eect of income (Yit) follows a logarithmic
functional form and is linearly separable from the eects of individual and job characteristics
(Xit and Zit). Thus, the happiness of employed and unemployed individuals is given by:
11hit(k) = g(Xit;Zkt) + log(Yit) + uit
hit(0) = f(Xit) + log(Yit) + uit
so that  can be written as:
 = EXit;Zkt[g(Xit;Zkt)   f(Xit)]; (i;k) 2 S
where Xit and Zit now exclude income.
I estimate  in two ways. First, I estimate a xed eects regression of happiness that






it + Xit + log(Yit) + i + uit
where Dreg and DSEP are indicators for being employed in a regular job and in a SEP.
Under the identifying assumption that uit is uncorrelated with employment in a SEP, b 2 is an
unbiased estimate of . However, there are several reasons why this assumption may be vio-
lated. First, entry into and exit from SEPs is non-random, so that unobserved shocks may be
correlated with employment in a SEP. This concern is similar to the one that was previously
discussed in the context of the matching estimator for the aggregate eect of employment in
a SEP. A concern that is specic to estimating the net eect of employment - excluding the
eect of income and consumption - is that entry into subsidized employment may increase
individuals' expectations of future income. This could lead individuals to increase their con-
sumption as they enter a SEP, which may positively aect their happiness (alternatively,
expected future income might have a direct eect if individuals receive happiness from antic-
ipating future income). Thus, entry into a SEP may be correlated with unobserved shocks
12to expected future income and consumption, which would bias the estimate of .
As a robustness test, I graphically examine the happiness of SEP participants at the end of
the project. SEPs usually last for one year, and most participants go back into unemployment
when they exit the project. Thus, one year after the start of the project, there is a sharp drop
in participants' probability of employment. But their incomes do not immediately decrease
since participation in a SEP extends their entitlement public unemployment benets. Also,
while participants' expectations of future income may increase as they enter a SEP, it is
unlikely that their expectations decrease discontinuously exactly one year after the start of
the project (since the duration of the project is known in advance). Thus, if employment
aects happiness independently of income, happiness should drop one year after the start
of a SEP, as employment ends while current and expected future income remain unchanged
(or at least do not change discontinuously). If, on the other hand, the eect of SEPs on
happiness is only due to their eect on income, we would not expect a drop in happiness one
year after the start of the project.
In addition to the graphical test, I calculate a xed eects instrumental variables esti-
mator. This estimator exploits the fact that participant's probability of employment drops
substantially one year after the start of a SEP while their incomes do not decline immedi-
ately. For this regression I use only observations of SEP participants after the start of a SEP
in order to avoid bias from endogenous entry and from shocks to expected future income that
may aect happiness at the start of a SEP. To avoid bias from endogenous exit from SEPs,
I instrument employment by an indicator for an individual's rst observation after entering
a SEP. The rst-stage relationship between this instrument and employment is created by
the fact that the usual SEP lasts for one year. This is the same as the average interval
between two observations in the German Socio-Economic Panel, so that the probability of
employment drops signicantly between the rst and second observation after entering a
SEP. The exclusion restriction rests on the assumption that SEP participants experience
no systematic unobserved shocks between their rst and second observation after entering a
13SEP. Additional robustness tests for this assumption are discussed in more detail in Section
5, together with the results.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical analysis in this paper uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP)8, from the years 1992 to 2004. The sample is restricted to respondents between the
ages of 18 and 65. The outcome of interest is respondents' self-reported happiness measured
by their answer to the question: \All things considered, on a scale from 0 to 10, how satis-
ed are you with your life?" 9. Answers to questions of this type correlate well with more
detailed measures of psychological distress (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2004) and physiolog-
ical indicators of well-being such as blood-pressure (Blanchower and Oswald, 2008). They
also predict suicide risk and mortality (e.g. Koivumaa-Honkanen 2001, Chida 2008). The
explanatory variable of interest is participation in subsidized employment projects (SEPs).
From 1992 onwards, the SOEP collected information on whether respondents were currently
employed in a SEP. Figure 2 shows that the sample estimate of the fraction of unemployed
individuals who participate in SEPs closely follows the actual time of participation.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the whole sample, of the unemployed and of indi-
viduals who participate in subsidized employment projects. For SEP participants, the table
reports summary statistics in the observation before the project began, so that the results
do not measure the eect of participation itself. To be comparable, the summary statistics
for the unemployed are based on the lagged observation in which individuals may still have
been employed. Columns 4 and 5 show dierences in means between participants in SEPs
and non-participants as well as between participants and the unemployed. Compared to the
population as a whole, SEP participants live in larger households with lower incomes, are
8See Wagner et al. (2007) or Frick et al. (2007) for detailed descriptions of the data
9As mentioned in the introduction, I follow Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) in using the term happiness as
synonymous with life-satisfaction. I do this to make the text more readable: saying that employment makes
people happy is a briefer way of saying that employment makes people more satised with their lives.
14more likely to be female and have a steady partner and report lower levels of happiness. Com-
pared to the unemployed, SEP participants are also younger and better educated. Clearly
participation in SEPs is not random, even conditional on being unemployed, so that we
should expect participants and non-participants to dier in observed as well as unobserved
characteristics.
5 Results
5.1 The eect of subsidized employment on happiness
Table 2 reports results of matching estimators of , the average eect of subsidized
employment projects (SEPs) on the happiness of their participants (which is the average
eect of treatment on the treated). The matching procedure is described in detail in Section
3.1. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report results from the whole sample of participants, while
columns 3 and 4 report results from the sub-sample of participants who were unemployed in
the pre-treatment observation.
For the baseline estimates, presented in columns 1 and 3, observations are matched on 11
pre-treatment variables: sex, age, years of education, marital status, household size, number
of children, unemployment status, household income, income from public unemployment
benets, region 10 and month of interview. In addition, the estimators presented in columns
2 and 4 match on pre-treatment happiness in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
factors that aect individuals' happiness. The rst row reports the simple nearest neighbor
matching estimate, the second row reports the estimate after correcting for potential bias
from remaining dierences in the control variables.
The results in Table 2 suggest that employment in SEPs has a large and statistically
signicant eect on participants' happiness falling in the range between 0.39 and 0.62 on the
0 to 10 scale - equivalent to between 0.3 and 0.5 within-individual standard deviations of
10Western or Eastern Germany
15self-reported happiness. The simple nearest neighbor estimates do not dier much from the
bias adjusted estimates, which suggests that the matching procedure succeeded in selecting
controls whose observed characteristics are similar to those of the participants they were
matched to.
By looking at the pre-treatment dierences in happiness, we can see that the matching
procedure appears to work better for the sub-sample of participants that were unemployed
in the pre-treatment observation, since their pre-treatment happiness is closer to that of the
matched controls. This is most likely because participants who were employed in the pre-
treatment observation are unusual in unobserved characteristics. As mentioned in Section
2, one of the formal pre-requisites for entering an SEP is to have been unemployed for 6
out of the preceding 12 months, though there are exceptions for special cases. Participants
who were employed in the pre-treatment observation are less likely to fulll the formal pre-
requisite, so they are more likely to be drawn from the special cases that are assigned to
SEPs through the discretion of the job-center and therefore more likely to have unusual
unobserved characteristics. My preferred specications are therefore the ones in columns 3
and 4 that are based on participants who were unemployed in the pre-treatment observation.
For them, the estimated eect of employment in SEPs is slightly smaller, but still large (at
around 0.4) and statistically signicant.
5.2 Does the conditional independence assumption hold?
As explained in Section 3.2, the matching estimator's identifying assumption is that in-
dividual i's (possibly counterfactual) happiness when unemployed, hit(0), is independent of
participation in a subsidized employment project, conditional on the matching variables.
Intuitively, since the estimator uses matched obervations to estimate participants' counter-
factual outcome if unemployed, the identifying assumption is that participants would have
been as (un)happy being unemployed as the matched controls who in fact were unemployed.
Since participation in SEPs is non-random, it is not obvious that this assumption holds. I
16therefore conduct the two robustness tests described in Section 3.2.
I rst test whether happier individuals self-select into subsidized employment projects,
perhaps because they are more motivated to work or because unobserved shocks - for example
to health - aect both happiness and the probability of participation. If this were the case,
participants would have been happier than matched controls even if they had remained
unemployed and the matching estimator would be biased upward. As a robustness test, I
compare the happiness of matched controls and participants in the year before they enter
the subsidized employment projects. Column 1 in Table 2 shows that the average pre-
treatment happiness of participants is slightly lower than that of the matched controls and
that the dierence is not statistically signicant, suggesting that there is no self-selection of
happier individuals SEPs11 But average pre-treatment dierences are not the only concern.
If unobserved shocks increase both happiness and the probability of entering a project, we
would expect the happiness of participants to increase relative to that of non-participants
right before the project begins. Thus, despite their slightly lower average happiness in
the pre-treatment observation, participants may have been happier than matched controls
at the time they entered the project. As a robustness test for this, Figure 3 plots the
average happiness of participants and matched controls in the 12 months before and after
the start of employment in a SEP. The plots are constructed as follows: For participants,
I use information on the start date of employment in a SEP and the interview date to
calculate how many months before or after the beginning of the project an interview took
place. For the post-treatment observation, matched controls are plotted at the same time-
coordinate as the participants they are matched to. I then use the time since the matched
individual's previous interview to calculate the time-coordinate at which her pre-treatment
observation is plotted. Since the intervals between two interviews are not xed, participants
and their matches are therefore not necessarily plotted at the same time-coordinate in the
11Surprisingly, the only estimator in which pre-treatment happiness of participants and matched controls
diers signicantly is the one that matched on pre-treatment happiness. However, this is only due to the
fact that matching on pre-treatment happiness decreased the standard error of the dierence in happiness,
so that the estimate is more precise.
17pre-treatment period. Still, this procedure makes sure that the pre-treatment time-trend is
correctly observed, since the controls' pre-treatment observations are plotted as many months
away from the beginning of the project as they would have been if they had entered it at the
same time as the participant they are matched to. Consistent with the average dierence
reported in Table 2, the top panel in Figure 3 shows that the pre-treatment happiness of
matched controls is slightly higher than that of the participants. Moreover, participants are
less happy than matched controls even right before the start of the project. This observation,
as well as the fact that participants' happiness is decreasing in the pre-treatment period but
starts to increase right at the start of the project, suggests that the results are not driven
by self-selection of happier individuals into the projects.
As a second robustness test, I test whether participants and matched controls dier in
how strongly their happiness is aected by unemployment. Since participation is largely
voluntary, people are likely to self-select into the projects according to how much they bene-
t from them. Participants' (counterfactual) happiness when unemployed may therefore be
dierent from that of the unemployed matched controls, which would violate the conditional
independence assumption. To test for dierences in happiness under unemployment, Column
3 in Table 2 reports dierences in the pre-treatment happiness of participants and matched
controls who were unemployed in the pre-treatment observation. The point estimate sug-
gests that participants are slightly less happy being unemployed than matched controls, but
the dierence is very small and not statistically signicant. In addition, the bottom panel in
Figure 3 shows that the pre-treatment trends in happiness are virtually identical for unem-
ployed future participants and matched controls, giving no evidence that participants adapt
more quickly to unemployment than matched controls.
Taken together these results suggest that there are no substantial violations of the condi-
tional independence assumption, so that the matched controls yield a good counterfactual for
the happiness participants would have experienced if they had remained unemployed. This
is particularly true for participants who were unemployed in the pre-treatment observation,
18who are the basis for my preferred specication. The matching estimates therefore suggest
a positive causal eect of subsidized employment on happiness.
5.3 Disentangling the eects of employment and income
The matching estimators presented in the previous section measure , the eect of SEPs
on the happiness of individuals who would otherwise have remained unemployed. But as
mentioned above, participation in a subsidized employment project has at least two conse-
quences: participants are employed and receive higher incomes. In order to inform policy, it
is important to know through which channel - employment or income - SEPs aect happi-
ness. A happiness-based argument for publicly subsidized jobs, similar to the one made by
Edlin and Phelps (2009), only holds if employment per se increases happiness. If participants
in SEPs are only happier because of their higher incomes, increased income transfers would
most likely be a more cost-eective way of increasing the happiness of the unemployed. This
section presents graphical evidence and quantitative results from xed eects and instru-
mental variables estimators, which all suggest that the eect of SEPs on happiness is due to
direct psychological benets and cannot be explained by the higher incomes of the employed
alone. The evidence is based on the fact that participation in a SEP prolongs individuals'
entitlement to public unemployment benets. Thus the projects' positive eect on income
remains even after employment in it has ended. This creates sucient independent variation
in income and employment to allow me to identify the eect of employment while controlling
for dierences in income.
Figure 4 plots the trends of employment, income and happiness around the start of
SEPs. In the rst year after entering an SEP, participants are employed in the project and
are substantially happier than the unemployed matched controls. Since the duration of SEPs
is usually limited to 12 months, most participants leave employment in the subsequent year
and are as likely to be employed as matched controls. But since participation in a SEP
prolongs individuals' entitlement to unemployment benets, participants' average income
19remains higher than that of matched controls. If income were responsible for the projects'
eect, we would expect participants to be signicantly happier than matched controls until
the dierence in incomes disappears. But the plot shows that the projects' positive eect on
happiness disappears in the second year after their start, at the same time as employment in
the project ends for most participants, suggesting that the eect is due to the psychological
benets of employment per se and not due to participants' increased incomes.
To obtain quantitative estimates of  - the pure eect of subsidized employment net of
the eect of increased income - I use the estimators described in Section 3.3. The simple
xed eects estimator reported in Table 3 shows that the correlation between participation
in SEPs and happiness remains strong and signicant even after controlling for income (both
current and future) and unobserved xed characteristics. The estimated eect is similar in
size to the matching estimates reported in Table 2. The estimated eect of employment
in SEPs is slightly smaller than that of employment in a regular job, wich is likely due to
unobserved heterogeneity in job characteristics.
Tables 4 and 5 report results from the xed eects instrumental variables estimator
described in Section 3.3. As described in that section, the estimator uses an indicator for an
individual's rst observation in a SEP as an instrument for employment in order to control
for endogenous exit from SEPs. The instrument exploits the fact that the usual duration
of SEPs is 12 months, so that participants' probability of employment drops signicantly
between their rst and second observation after entering a SEP 12.
However, as shown in Figure 4, participants' expected incomes do not immediately de-
crease as employment ends, because participation prolongs their entitlement to payments
through the public unemployment insurance. This creates independent variation in em-
ployment and income, which makes it possible to use the decrease in the probability of
employment after 12 months as an instrument for employment while still controlling for
income.
12The average interval between observations in the German Socio-Economic Panel is 12 months.
20As explained in Section 3.3, I restrict the sample for the xed eects IV estimator to
SEP participants and use only observations made after the start of a SEP. Observations
before the start of a SEP are dropped in order to avoid endogeneity bias stemming from
unobserved shocks that simultaneously increase happiness and the probability of entering a
SEP. To reduce noise from unobserved time-trends, I limit the sample to the rst observation
after the project's start and the 5 subsequent ones. For participants with multiple spells of
employment in a SEP, each spell is treated separately. That is, the rst observation in a
SEP spell is used as an instrument for employment and the 5 subsequent observations are
included in the analysis, regardless of whether the individual enters another SEP during that
time. This makes sure that the estimates are not aected by repeated endogenous entry into
SEPs. It does, however, have the consequence that some observations are \double-counted",
if an individual enters more than one SEP in a 5 year period. To make sure that this double-
counting does not lead me to over-state the precision of the estimates, the reported standard
errors are clustered at the individual level.
The rst-stage results, reported in Table 4 show that the probability of employment
drops between 52 and 59 percentage points between the rst observation after entering
a SEP and later observations, an eect that is large and statistically signicant. The 2-
stage least squares estimates in Table 5 show that employment in SEPs has a large and
statistically signicant eect on happiness, even after controlling for income, both current
and future. Ranging between 0.39 and 0.50, the estimated eect is large compared to the
within-individual standard deviation of 1.32 and compared to the \eects" of the control
variables. The next subsection discusses the identifying assumptions of the instrumental
variables estimator in more detail and presents robustness tests for them. The subsequent
sections discuss whether increased consumption or misreporting of happines can explain the
results.
215.3.1 Robustness tests for the xed eects IV estimator
The identifying asumption for the IV estimator is that the instrument is uncorrelated with
the error term. In the present context, this means that there can be no systematic unobserved
shocks that aect happiness between individuals' rst and second observation after entering
a SEP. This assumption is likely to hold, since unobserved shocks that occur after the start
of a SEP are likely to be evenly distributed over time, so there is no reason to believe that
they would aect happiness in the rst year dierently than in the following years. One
concern is that systematic unobserved shocks occur before the start of the program (perhaps
because these shocks increase the probability of participation) whose eect persists in the
rst year of the project and wear o in later years. If this were the case, the instrumental
variables estimate would be biased. Reassuringly, the results in Section 5.2 suggest that
there are no systematic unobserved shocks to happiness in the run-up to entering a SEP,
since the time trends of happiness of participants and matched controls are almost identical
in the year before entering the SEP (shown in Figure 4). To further control for persistent
pre-project shocks, the models in columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 include a time-trend that
begins with the start of the SEP. If pre-project shocks increase the happiness of participants
at the beginning of the project, their eects should wear o over time, so that we expect
happiness to decrease after the start of the project. Assuming that these (potential) shocks
wear o gradually, and not discontinuously between the rst and second year after entering
a SEP, their eects can be controlled for by a time-trend. The estimates in columns 3, and
4 of Table 5 should therefore identify the causal eect of employment even in the presence
of systematic unobserved shocks to happiness before the start of the program. Additional
robustness tests for the exclusion restriction are discussed below.
The exclusion restriction also implies that individuals have to be as happy being employed
in SEPs as they are in the jobs they hold in subsequent years. A concern is that regular
jobs and jobs in SEPs dier in their eect on happiness due to dierences in unobserved
characteristics, which would violate the exclusion restriction. As a robustness test, I test
22whether the individuals in the sample are as happy when employed in the rst year after
the start of a SEP as they are when employed in subsequent years. The regression results in
Table 6 support the exclusion restriction since there are only small dierences between the
eect of employment in the rst year after the start of a SEP and later years.
The second implication of the exclusion restriction is that individuals would have been
as happy being unemployed in the rst year after the start of a SEP as they are being
unemployed in later periods. Unfortunately, I cannot test this condition in the same way
that I tested equality of outcomes under employment since all individuals are employed in
the rst observation after the start of a SEP. However, it is less likely that this condition
is violated since there is less heterogeneity in the situation of the unemployed than in the
situation of the employed. One potential violation would occur if individuals adapt to
unemployment, so that they are happier being unemployed in later years. As a robustness
test, I test for a time trend in the happiness of individuals who are unemployed following a
spell in a SEP (t >1). Finding a time-trend would suggest that the eect of unemployment
on happiness is changing over time so that the exclusion restriction would be violated. The
results in Table 7 show that this is not the case. The interaction of unemployment and time
has only a very small and statistically insignicant eect on happiness, which suggests that
the eect of unemployment is stable over time, so that the second condition of the exclusion
restriction is satised.
Taken together, the results of the robustness tests suggest that the instrumental variables
estimator is an unbiased estimator of the Local Average Treatment Eect - the eect of
subsidized employment (net of the eect of income) on individuals who participate in a
subsidized employment project and are unemployed at some point within 5 years after the
project's start.
235.4 Can changes in consumption or expected future income ex-
plain the results?
The instrumental variables estimators presented in columns 1 through 3 of Table 4 esti-
mate the eect of employment on happiness while controlling for the eect of current income.
But this may not be enough to to isolate the pure psychological eect of employment. If in-
dividuals rationally maximize lifetime utility, their current consumption is a function of their
expected lifetime income (Friedman, 1957). Thus, if employment in SEPs increases expected
lifetime income, it may aect individuals' happiness by increasing their consumption. An
increase in expected lifetime income might also increase happiness directly if individuals gain
happiness from anticipating future income. To rule these channels out, the model in column
4 of Table 4 adds respondents' average income in all future observations as an additional
control variable. In addition, the time trend from the start of the SEP should control for the
shock to consumption that comes with starting employment in a SEP. As mentioned in the
previous sub-section, this trend controls for shocks that occur at (or before) the start of the
SEP and wear o gradually. If individuals conform to the Permanent Income Hypothesis,
their consumption should increase discontinuosuly as they are oered a job in a SEP, since
this constitutes a shock to their expected future income. However, in later periods, their
consumption should decline gradually 13, so that the time trend should control for the eect
of declining consumption. The results in column 4 of Table 4 show that estimated eect of
future income is strongly positive, and that the time trend from the start of a SEP is nega-
tive, though neither of them is statistically signicant. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that future income aects happiness either through consumption or anticipation
and that part of the eect of SEPs operates through this channel. But even after controlling
for this channel, the remaining eect of employment is large and statistically signicant.
This result suggests that employment has psychological benets that are independent of its
13In fact, if individuals have quadratic utility over consumption, their expected consumption should follow
a linear trend (Hall, 1978).
24eects on income and consumption.
5.5 Can misreporting of happiness explain the results?
A vital concern when studying self-reported happiness is whether answers to questions
like \how satisifed are you with your life?" measure well-being in a meaningful way. One
reassuring nding is that self-reported life-satisfaction correlates well with more detailed
measures of psychological distress (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2004) and predicts objective
outcomes like suicide and mortality (e.g. Koivumaa-Honkanen 2001, Chida 2008). Still, in
specic cases there could be systematic misreporting of life-satisfaction due to social norms.
In many cultures work is seen as a valuable and central aspect of life, so that respondents
may be reluctant to admit being happy while unemployed. It is therefore possible that the
unemployed under-report their happiness compared to the employed, which would bias the
estimated eect of employment upward.
While I cannot fully rule out that unemployed individuals misreport their happiness
relative to those in subsidized employment projects, there are several reasons to believe that
the eect of misreporting is small. First, the life-satisfaction question is the last question
in a long multi-purpose survey (the German Socio-Economic Panel), while the questions
about employment are asked in the rst half of the survey. Respondents are therefore
not \primed" on their employment status when answering the life-satisfaction question. In
addition, respondents are not aware that their answers will be used to study the eect of
employment on happines, which should further reduce misreporting due to social norms.
Further evidence against misreporting comes from the data. If the unemployed underreport
their happiness for reasons of social acceptability, we would expect to see a sharp increase
in reported happiness at the start of the SEP. But as shown in Figure 3, happiness initially
remains low and increases over the course of the project; a pattern that is not easily explained
by misreporting due to socially preferred answers 14.
14The upward trend is more plausibly explained by a gradual and cumulative eect of employment on
256 Conclusion
This paper tries to answer two questions: does unemployment make people unhappy and,
if yes, can subsidized employment increase people's happiness? Its ndings, based on data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel, suggest that the answer to both questions is \yes".
A matching estimator suggests that participants in subsidized employment projects (SEPs)
are substantially happier than they would have been if they had remained unemployed.
Panel data on pre-project happiness suggests that this eect is not due to self-selection of
happier individuals into the projects. The data further suggest that the increase in income
that comes with subsidized employment does not explain the eect. In the German context,
participation in a subsidized employment project prolongs participants' entitlement to public
unemployment benets, so that their average income does not decrease after the project ends,
even though 60% of participants become unemployed. Yet happiness sharply decreases after
the project ends, suggesting that most of the previous increase in happiness was due to
the projects' eect on employment and that only a small fraction, if any, can be explained
by their eect on income. Taken together, the results presented in the paper suggest that
subsidized employment can have a large positive eect on the happiness of individuals who
would otherwise be unemployed.
The paper's results are relevant for two reasons. First, they constitute conclusive evidence
for a causal eect of unemployment on happiness. While previous studies (e.g. Clark and
Oswald 1994, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998, Marks and Fleming 1999, Clark 2003,
Carroll 2007) found correlations between (changes in) unemployment and happiness, they
were unable to rule out that the correlation was due to reverse causality from happines to
unemployment, or caused by unobserved shocks - for example to health - that simultaneously
decrease happiness and increase the probability of unemployment. By showing that the
eect of subsidized employment projects on happiness is not due to self-selection of happier
happiness. For example, if part of the psychological benet of employment comes from the social ties to ones
co-workers, we would expect happiness to increase as these social ties strengthen over time.
26individuals into the projects, the current paper provides strong evidence that the eect
of unemployment on happiness is causal. Second, the results have implications for labor
market policy. For some time, economists (e.g. Edlin and Phelps 2009, Phelps 1994, Katz
1996) have argued that subsidies for low-wage jobs should replace traditional transfer-based
welfare policy and several countries (most notably France, but also the Netherlands and the
UK) have introduced subsidies of this type. Recently, Edlin and Phelps (2009) have cited
potential psychological benets of employment as an additional argument for subsidising
low-wage jobs. The main nding of this paper - that subsidized employment can increase
people's happiness directly and not just by increasing their incomes - gives empirical support
to their argument.
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31Table 1: Summary Statistics
Means (in previous observation) Dierences
Whole Sample Unemployed SEP Participants Participants to Participants to
Non-Participants Unemployed
Female 0.510 0.521 0.591 0.082 0.070
(0.500) (0.500) (0.492) [0.029]** [0.027]**
Age 40.6 42.1 40.5 -0.08 1.65
(12.7) (12.4) (10.6) [0.60]* [0.58]
Steady Partner 0.642 0.602 0.656 0.014 0.055
(0.479) (0.491) (0.476) [0.027] [0.025]**
Household Size 2.97 2.87 3.19 0.22 0.312
(1.20) (1.23) (1.26) [0.07]*** [0.068]***
HH Income (Euros/month) 2762 2112 2012 -753 -99.9
(1513) (1092) (945) [52]*** [50.5]**
Years of education 11.9 11.2 11.7 -0.17 0.46
(2.4) (1.9) (2.0) [0.13] [0.12]***
Self-reported happiness 6.86 5.89 5.44 -1.43 0.44
(1.75) (2.00) (2.06) [0.11]*** [0.11]***
Observations 90185 6236 413 90185 6649
Individuals 11366 2605 329 11366 2649
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. Values for SEP participants are from the pre-treatment observation.
For comparison, values for the whole sample and the unemployed are from the lagged observation. Standard deviations in
parentheses. Standard errors of dierences in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels.
32Table 2: Eect of Subsidized Employment Projects on Happiness: Matching Estimators
All participants Unemployed in
pre-treatment obs.
Eects on: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Happiness 0.485 0.543 0.389 0.390
(0.112)*** (0.0101)*** (0.136)*** (0.119)***
Happiness (bias adjusted) 0.531 0.620 0.430 0.434
(0.112)*** (0.098)*** (0.136)*** (0.113)***
Pre-Treatment Dierences:
Happiness -0.119 -0.125 -0.031 -0.032
(0.121) (0.053)** (0.141) (0.061)
Happiness (bias adjusted) -0.092 - -0.008 -
(0.120) (0.140)
Matched on pre-treatment happiness No Yes No Yes
Number of SEP spells 413 413 296 296
Data source: SOEP, 1992-2004. Standard errors in parenthesis. ***,** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 %
level. Estimates are based on individuals' rst observation in an employment-spell in a SEP and 3 matched observations. For
the baseline matching, observations are matched on: sex, age, years of education, relationship status, household size, number
of children, household income, unemployment status, household income from unemployment benets, region (Western/Eastern
Germany) and month of interview. To avoid reverse causality, observations are matched on values in the pre-SEP observation.
33Table 3: Employment vs. Income: Fixed Eects Estimates
Dependent Variable:Happiness
(1) (2) (3)
Employed in regular job 0.56 0.51 0.49
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)**
Employed in SEP 0.45 0.43 0.40
(0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Not seeking employment 0.28 0.24 0.26
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)***
Log Household Income 0.23 0.21
(0.03)*** (0.03)***
Log Inc. from Unemp. Benets -0.021 -0.020
(0.003)*** (0.005)***




Education (years) 0.005 0.006
(0.016) (0.017)
Lives with partner 0.18 0.20
(0.05)*** (0.05)
Household Size -0.061 -0.078
(0.023)*** (0.025)***
Number of children 0.095 0.090
(0.027)*** (0.029)***
Eastern Germany -0.37 -0.29
(0.11)*** (0.12)**
Constant 6.03 5.78 2.48
(0.04) (0.34) (0.66)
Number of observations 34911 34911 30352
Number of individuals 4892 4892 4462
Data source: SOEP, 1992-2004. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels. All models include
individual and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The baseline employment status is
unemployed and looking for work.
34Table 4: Instrumental Variables Estimates: First Stage
Dependent Variable: Employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First observation after start of SEP 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.59
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)**
Log Household Income 0.070 0.073 0.106
(0.035)** (0.036)** (0.039)
Log Inc. from Unemp. Benets -0.024 -0.024 -0.023
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Log Avg. Future Income 0.24
(0.11)**
Age -0.0003 -0.0066 0.00042
(0.0063) (0.0066) (0.0066)
Education (years) 0.017 0.015 0.009
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036)**
Lives with partner 0.055 0.056 0.061
(0.069) (0.069) (0.076)
Household Size -0.063 -0.063 -0.072
(0.027)** (0.028)** (0.030)**
Number of children 0.013 0.008 0.017
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Eastern Germany -0.50 -0.49 -0.48
(0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.17)***
t (years after start of SEP spell) 0.023 0.024
(0.023) (0.008)***
Constant 0.41 0.38 0.59 -1.66
(0.05) (0.54) (0.53) (1.09)
Number of observations 2493 2493 2493 2216
Number of individuals 406 406 406 371
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels.
All models include individual and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (using a clustered
bootstrap with 500 replications). The sample only contains SEP participants and is restricted to individuals' rst 6 observations
after the start of a SEP.
35Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates: Second Stage
Dependent Variable: Happiness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed 0.44 0.53 0.45 0.40
(0.15)*** (0.14)*** (0.15)*** (0.16)**
Log Household Income -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Log Inc. from Unemp. Benets -0.030 -0.032 -0.032
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Log Avg. Future Income 0.53
(0.34)
Age 0.002 0.008 0.009
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
Education (years) 0.22 0.22 0.23
(0.10)** (0.10)** (0.11)**
Lives with partner -0.04 -0.04 0.09
(0.26) (0.26) (0.34)
Household Size 0.07 0.06 0.002
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Number of children 0.17 0.17 0.19
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Eastern Germany -1.44 -1.48 -1.14
(0.74)* (0.74)** (0.71)
t (years after start of SEP spell) -0.021 -0.023
(0.023) 0.024
Constant 5.31 4.12 3.95 -0.28
(0.17) (2.12) (2.13) (3.81)
Number of observations 2493 2493 2493 2216
Number of individuals 406 406 406 371
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels.
All models include individual and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (using a clustered
bootstrap with 500 replications). Employment is instrumented by an indicator for the rst observation after the start of an
employment spell in a subsidized employment project (SEP). The sample only contains SEP participants and is restricted to
individuals' rst 6 observations after the start of an SEP.
36Table 6: Robustness tests: changes in the eect of employment over time
Dependent variable: Happiness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employed 0.45 0.47 0.44 0.40
(0.09)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.11)***
Employed in periods t >1 0.017 -0.061 -0.018 -1.8*10-05
(0.08) (0.085) (0.11) (0.11)
Log Household Income -0.033 -0.036 -0.045
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
Log Inc. from Unemp. Benets -0.032 -0.033 -0.032
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Log Avg. Future Income 0.53
(0.35)
Age 0.002 0.008 0.009
(0.025) (0.027) (0.029)
Education (years) 0.22 0.22 0.23
(0.12)* (0.11)* (0.10)
Lives with partner -0.034 -0.035 0.089
(0.27) (0.28) (0.31)
Household Size 0.061 0.062 0.002
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Number of children 0.17 0.17 0.19
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Eastern Germany -1.49 -1.49 -1.14
(0.71)** (0.74)** (0.63)*
t (years after start of SEP spell) -0.021 -0.023
(0.025) (0.026)
Constant 5.29 4.16 3.97 -0.28
(0.17) (2.18) (2.06) (3.63)
Number of observations 2493 2493 2493 2216
Number of individuals 406 406 406 371
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels.
All models include individual and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (using a clustered
bootstrap with 500 replications). The sample only contains SEP participants and is restricted to individuals' rst 6 observations
after the start of a SEP.
37Table 7: Robustness tests: adaptation to unemployment
Dependent variable: Happiness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not employed -0.42 -0.38 -0.41 -0.38
(0.11)*** (0.11)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)***
Not employed  t -0.016 -0.022 -0.006 -0.009
(0.033) (0.032) (0.039) (0.040)
Log Household Income -0.039 -0.038 -0.046
(0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Log Inc. from Unemp. Benets -0.031 -0.032 -0.032
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Log Avg. Future Income 0.53
(0.32)*
Age -9.6*10-4 0.007 0.008
(0.025) (0.027) (0.030)
Education (years) 0.22 0.22 0.23
(0.11)* (0.12)* (0.11)**
Lives with partner -0.032 -0.034 0.090
(0.27) (0.27) (0.32)
Household Size 0.063 0.062 0.002
(0.097) (0.10) (0.11)
Number of children 0.17 0.17 0.19
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Eastern Germany -1.45 -1.48 -1.14
(0.76)* (0.81)* (0.68)*
t (years after start of SEP spell) -0.021 -0.021
(0.024) (0.025)
Constant 5.78 4.78 4.44 0.15
(0.17) (2.18) (2.16) (3.50)
Number of observations 2493 2493 2493 2216
Number of individuals 406 406 406 371
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. *, ** and *** denote statistical signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels.
All models include individual and year xed eects. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (using a clustered
bootstrap with 500 replications). The sample only contains SEP participants and is restricted to individuals' rst 6 observations
after the start of a SEP.
38Figure 1: Prevalence of Subsidized Employment Projects
Source: Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit
Figure 2: Percentage of Unemployed in Subsidized Employment Projects
Data source: German Socio-Economic Panel, 1992-2004. Start dates are based on retrospective reports of individuals that
have started a SEP since the previous observation. In 1996, respondents were not asked about SEP participation, so that the
estimate for the previous year, 1995, is missing.
39Figure 3: Trends of Happiness around the Start of Subsidized Employment projects










































































Estimates are based on individuals in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) that started employment in a SEP in the period
1992-2004 and controls from a nearest neighbor matching procedure. For each participant, the graph plots two observations, one
before and one after the start of the project. The horizontal axis plots the time of the interview in months before/after the start
of the SEP. Control observations in the \post-treatment" period are plotted at the same time-coordinate as the observation of
the matched participant. The time since the control individual's previous interview is then used to calculate the time-coordinate
at which the corresponding pre-treatment control observation is plotted.
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Years from start of SEP (t=0.5 is first obs. during SEP)
Participants Matched Controls
Household income
Estimates are based on individuals in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) that started employment
in a SEP in the period 1992-2004. For the time axis, t=0.5 is dened as the rst observation after the start
of employment in the SEP. The average interval between two observations of the same individual in the
SOEP - one year - is used to calculate the other values of t. Happiness is measured on a scale from 0 to 10.
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